The Generics
The Roundup suite is a collection of client and server applications developed mainly by the University of Massachusetts Amherst mainly under the direction of Brian Levine . The purpose of these tools is stated to be the investigation of sexual contraband on the internet.
The components of Roundup consist of several parts. Those parts include but are not limited too:
- Roundup Ares (Ares Network)
- Roundup eMule (eDonkey and Kademlia Networks)
- Roundup Gigatribe (Gigatribe Network)
- Roundup Gnutella (Gnuetella v1 and v2) (orig. written in Java, fork of Phex?)
- Roundup Freenet (aka. Black Ice)
- Roundup Torrential Downpour (BitTorrent)
- Roundup Torrential Downpour Receptor (BitTorrent)
- Roundup Torrent Viewer (BitTorrent)
- Roundup Tor (Any Tor node detected with any traffic)
- Roundup IRC (Variety of Internet Chat forums)
- Child Online Protection System (aka. COPS, ICACCOPS Database)
- ICAC can be used confusingly between the entirety of ICAC task forces, or individual branches, or when referring to ICAC Databases both regarding Roundup or it’s competitors.
- “ICAC maintains a library of files that contain images and videos of child pornography and their associated hash values. Law enforcement officers may access ICAC’s library or an officer’s own agency’s library to attempt to determine whether a particular file contains potential child pornography by comparing the has values of the files.” ~ US v. Thomas Nos. 5:12-cr-37. 5:12-cr-44, 5:12-cr-97.
“RoundUp was developed by entities and individuals including the University of Massachusetts Department of Computer Science, the Georgetown University Department of Computer Science, and former Pennsylvania State Police Computer Crimes supervisor Robert Erdely , among others.”
Some Specifics
The Roundup suite as a whole has always raised questions in one form or another. Some of it’s modules such as Torrential Downpour have been subject to repeated critiques resulting in the government choosing to dismiss charges rather than allow a defendant to examine or question the software itself.
The typical rebuttal of the government in regards to all Roundup modules revolve around the following: (1) You can’t examine our software, and (2) Our software is the one, single, perfect creation in all of history - trust us (zero failure rate).
Regardless moral or ethical arguments, regardless fearmongering or conflation of ideas, and regardless the guilt or innocence of any defendant - the government’s end goal results in lives ending even if only by accusation. The government must be held to every burden of proof.
Ultimately, if the Roundup suite functioned as advertised by investors there isn’t reason to withhold any information. Source code included. Certainly, government withholding information is at a minimum, questionable.
Despite the previous points, it cannot be forgotten that the government goes through great lengths in order to artifically separate liabilities and responsibilities regarding their ventures into these softwares and investigations. It should come as no surprise in at least two examples.
The first example is Roundup itself. Much of the work was intentionally outsourced to various educationaly institutions rather than being claimed under the banner of any governmenal entity. Yet, these are still funded by law enforcement entities such as the FBI.
A second notable example is the NCMEC reporting entity being a “non-profit”, rather than a direct government-run operation.
These examples exist plainly as what they appear to be. They are effectively shell entities which protect the government and it’s assets under the guise of being a non-governmental agency. Setups such as these are aimed at allowing the government to operate with an additional layer of red tape regarding laws or scrutiny which would otherwise hinder them. A notable example has occurred in cases involving Torrential Downpour, where the government has used the excuse that - (1) it cannot turn over something that isn’t within it’s possession, (2) it isn’t allowed to show people Torrential Downpour without permission from it’s creators, and (3) the creator’s don’t want to allow testing because it may hinder their income, (4) allowing anyone to test their software would allow people to find ways of “hiding” from investigations. These points all referring to attempts at having these tools tested. These have eventually failed, and at the current time of writing we now sit around half a decade since tools like TD and TDR have largely receded into the realm of junk. The government still chose to drop the charges related to the software and bypass testing by the defense.
Anyone following the news releases of alleged internet sex crimes - they would have noticed a significant shift away from cases involving P2P investigations beginning around the same time. The new golden goose is NCMEC reports provided by third-parties such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Dropbox, etc. Having said this, will the government simply abandon millions of dollars worth of infrastructure when it costs relatively little to maintain? Surely, no. They will continue to operate Roundup and there will continue to be cases, but whereas between 2010 and 2020 nearly every case reported in the news was related to this software suite, that number is low enough to be unwarranted of calculation in my opinion.